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Saturday, January 22, 2005

The Error of Modern Macroeconomic Policy 

From: Gunnar Tómasson
To:
gang8@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 8:32 PM
Subject: Re: [gang8] Correction: Re: Re: Richebacher: The Missing Link - reflections on trade
James,

I agree with you "that, antecedent to the collapse of the IMF and, indeed, a crucial cause of it, was the misunderstanding of interest-rate and fiscal effects, especially in relation to inflation from 1969 onwards."

In this respect, I thought I should repost my earlier message of November 15, 2003 commenting on the analysis of related issues presented in your book The Indigent Rich back in the early 1970s.

In due course - and these things do take time! - I am sure that economic historians will

(a) note the fact that, well before anyone else, you saw through the polished surface of the ramshackle affair that is contemporary economic orthodoxy and called its bluff while there was still time to avoid the economic policy mistakes which, by now, threaten to unleash world-wide financial, economic, and social instability; and

(b) regret that a solitary voice of sanity was not heard.

The fact that Jan - rated by Randy as "the best economist in the world", as I recall it - and the great majority of his mainstream, monetarist, and heterodox peers still don't get it reaffirms what Robert Lekachman suggested in 1976:

"Young economists emerge uneducated, Ph. Ds in hand, for want of knowledge of the history of their own subject."

Gunnar

*******

Here is my message of November 15, 2003:


Dear James:

As it happens, I just finished reading your book The Indigent Rich, having read the first nine chapters when I received it months ago - my mind has been preoccupied with some other things.

For those who have not had an opportunity to read the book, here are the opening paragraphs of your Introduction:

"It is strange that we can be so wrong about so many things for so long. We seem to be guilty of recurrent economic idiocy. Not just a small idiocy, but idiocy on a grand scale. And it happens about every generation. J. K. Galbraith was probably thinking, inter alia, of something like this when he wrote about the error of 'conventional wisdom'. But he has been guilty of the same error himself, along with a multitude of his professional colleagues.

"We always think that the same economic problems recur and require the same solutions. History is, in our minds, constantly repeating itself. But, in fact, it isn't. We know full well, from experience, that economic history, despite the old saw, does not repeat itself. But we go on acting as though it does.

"Consequently, we go on causing ourselves much more trouble - and causing a great many people a great deal more distress - than is necessary. This trouble and distress afflict the domestic economy but their scale is such that they also afflict other economies and, inter alia, damage the relationships between the developing countries and the whole of the developing world.

"There is a curious similarity between the error into which we have recently fallen and the error into which economists and policy-makers fell in the pre-Keynesian period of the 1930's. Then the theories and policies intensified the very diseases which they were intended to remedy or avert. The same thing is happening now. Not entirely, but in part. Fundamentally, we try to solve our problems of economic disequilibrium by measures which - in practice - intensify them. As in the 1930's, so now we could scarcely do worse if we tried. We act as we do because we think we are still solving economic problems in the context of the 1930's. We are not; but we think so. And the error goes on being repeated however long it would seem to be obvious that the solutions are just as outdated as our conception of the economic environment in which they are being tackled.

"To put this a little more specifically, we seek to maintain domestic economic stability by applying or reversing the means which brought us such splendid success at the advent of the Keynesian era. When we are confronted with inflation, we immediately react with policies reversing the fiscal and monetary stimulation which is thought to have caused the inflation. Modern economic policies have created and maintained full employment through active and generally invigorating fiscal and monetary measures. Therefore, the pundits argue that, if these measures go too far and create unacceptable inflation, the solution is to take them off. It is all so simple. Turn on the tap to move the economy up; turn it off to move the economy down.

"Almost every economist worth his salt sings or dances to this canticle. Not only do they believe it but they act upon it. And they nod sagely when anyone else - even their political enemies - act upon it.

"That it doesn't work is, for them, almost an obiter dictum. It should work. All the economists agree it should work. If it seems not to work, then, say the economists, it is because the politicians or the bankers or both have not had the courage or the competence to do the job properly; or the trade unions don't know what is good for them and the country; or the employers don't; or there are 'special factors' which have ruined a good policy in the hands of sincere people.

"But the plain fact of the matter is that it does not work. The examples of countries and situations in which it has not worked are now far too many for there to be any doubt that it does not work...."

Now fast-forward to the present of The Washington Consensus:

All the economists agree it should work. If it seems not to work, then, say the economists, it is because the politicians or the bankers or both have not had the courage or the competence to do the job properly; or [X, Y, and Z - now that trade unions don't matter much any more] don't know what is good for them and the country; or the employers don't; or there are 'special factors' which have ruined a good policy in the hands of sincere people.

James, you were right then, and now!

Gunnar
----- Original Messa
ge -----
From:
James Cumes
To:
gang8@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 12:25 PM
Subject: Re: [gang8] Correction: Re: Re: Richebacher: The Missing Link - reflections on trade
Gunnar,

Yes, you know that I agree with you in most of what you say.
But don't forget that, antecedent to the collapse of the IMF and, indeed, a crucial cause of it, was the misunderstanding of interest-rate and fiscal effects, especially in relation to inflation from 1969 onwards.
That is the basis on which Gang 8 was created and has - largely - been built.
Geoffrey's book, "Towards True Monetarism" is, in many ways, the bible to be consulted to get the hang of how the whole inflation problem was mishandled and how the consequences of that mishandling then - see my own books - brought about a shift of the inflationary impact from domestic consumer-price rises to deficits in the balance of trade/payments, to the creation of export economies dependent for their prosperity and rapid economic development on the persistence of supply shortages and consequent deficits in the external trade and payments of the hyper-consumer economies and to the tangle of dollar weakness, lower-income poverty and inequality, major and fundamental shifts of economic, political and strategic power, and all the rest.
Whatever the surplus economies may wish and however complacent the American managers may be, a major adjustment in the plates of the Earth's economic crust just must take place, one would think pretty soon now. The resultant earthquake could well be a Force 9 or even above, and the tsunami that it will precipitate could well sweep away, not only much of what remains of the former glory of the United States economy - and even the political and strategic dominance that it has so far enjoyed - but also much of what we value in the other continents, sadly including my own country of Australia.


James Cumes
http://www.authorsden.com/jameswcumes
----- Original Message -----
From: Gunnar Tómasson
To: gang8@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 2:59 PM
Subject: Re: [gang8] Correction: Re: Re: Richebacher: The Missing Link - reflections on trade
Geoffrey,

Re. the following:

Jan made the point that so long as the rest of the world wants dollar assets, there is nothing the US can do about it.

Comment:

True - but besides the point!

For the decades-long U.S. consumption binge and attendant transformation of the U.S. domestic economic structure is the direct result of the U.S. government's decision to

1. Scuttle the Bretton Woods system unilaterally; and

2. Oppose any multilateral replacement thereof.

As noted by then IMF Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer in an address commemorating its fiftieth anniversary, this left the IMF - (the rest of the world) without any say over world monetary arrangements.

In this respect, the merit of the Bretton Woods system was that the U.S. and other nations of the world were essentially on a level playing field insofar as their "overdrafts" on the rest of the world were concerned.

That is not the world we live in now.

At the national level, Jan's argument translates into the proposition -

- that so long as the rest of the domestic economy wants pound/Euro/etc. assets cranked out by national financial systems, there is nothing national authorities can do about it.

Why, then, should there be any constraint on domestic credit creation?

Gunnar


----- Original Message -----
From: Geoffrey Gardiner
To: gang8@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 7:57 AM
Subject: Re: [gang8] Correction: Re: Re: Richebacher: The Missing Link - reflections on trade
Gunnar,

When this point was raised at Philip Arestis' conference in March, following addresses by Jan Kregel and Randy Wray, I pointed out that the transfer of capital to North America appears to have taken place continually for 400 years, with the exception of brief periods during and after the two world wars of the 20th century. Do we have any figures for the level of that transfer? Did it represent the same percentage of GDP as now?

I cannot buy the idea that it is the fault of anyone in America. Jan made the point that so long as the rest of the world wants dollar assets, there is nothing the US can do about it. The odd thing is that European countries would scream murder if the US stopped importing their products.



Geoff

----- Original Message -----
From: vze288fn@verizon.net
To: gang8@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2005 5:55 PM
Subject: [gang8] Correction: Re: Re: Richebacher: The Missing Link - reflections on trade
Oops! Arno,The problem is not free trade - but free lunch!For the past three decades, the US has fueled domestic nominal demand for goods and services through credit creation which has been vastly excessive relative to the requirements of a growing domestic output of goods and services.What's wrong with that?In the 1970s, I recall reading a Newsweek column by Milton Friedman in which he "reasoned" that there was no need for the US to worry about its trade deficit for, so long as Japan and others were ready to add to their US dollar investment portfolios, the US was in fact exchanging paper for products.The downside of this is, among other things, that the inflation of US domestic nominal demand through credit creation has NOT spilled over into US domestic price inflation thanks to the supply of goods and services from the rest of the world.This has skewed the structure of relative US domestic prices in a way which discourages productive investment as distinct from investment in the financial services sector and speculative activity (asset price inflation).The culprit is not free trade - but the Friedmanite notion that a mature economy can go on decades-long debt-financed consumption binge supported by the rest of the world WITHOUT serious adverse effects on its domestic economic structure.
Gunnar

Thursday, January 13, 2005

The Vital Force of Investment 

The Vital Force of Investment

If the more favourable prospects for the future are to be realised, the vital importance of a satisfactory investment policy must be acknowledged. Investment foreshadows the future of a person, a country or the world economy.
The competitive position of those countries - the highly-developed, free-enterprise economies for the most part - which continue to apply orthodox Keynesian or monetarist policies is being steadily eroded. Those countries for the most part are the high-living-standard, high-labour-cost countries which, to maintain their competitive position, must depend on a high level of investment and high-technology production, together with effective utilisation of their well-educated and highly-skilled labour forces. They would normally be in the vanguard of applying new techniques of production and management. The application of these advanced techniques would enable them to preserve their position as advanced economies. If there were any failure of their capacity to devise and apply advanced techniques on a continuing basis, they would be overtaken in productive capacity - in the capacity to produce cheaply - and eventually in living standards by other countries which have, heretofore, been well behind them in the economic heirarchy.A crucial factor in this is the maintenance of investment. Over the long term, the strength of almost any economic unit will depend on the size and the relevance of net investment. Massive investment in production of commodities for which there is no or an insufficient market will not make for strength. Investment must be relevant. It must too be sufficient to cover depreciation, otherwise the capital stock of the economic unit will be reduced and its capacity to deliver so as to sustain existing levels of living will decline. But relevant investment at a level only slightly greater than that sufficient to meet depreciation will almost certainly not satisfy individual and social expectations in a modern society and economy. People in a modern society demand not only higher material standards on a continuing basis but they also look to environmental improvements, greater social security, more effective administration, aid to poorer countries and so on. Net investment will need to be sufficient to cover these expectations.Lying within this broad requirement, there is another crucial consideration. This is the need for incentives to invest. These incentives must be of sufficient force to induce people not only to replace existing productive equipment and to install technologically more advanced equipment, but also to undertake the research and development expenditures necessary to discover new technologies and to apply them with maximum effectiveness. Where net investment is low, it will almst certainly take place only at the basic technological level of replacement of plant incorporating existing - and probably old, obsolescent or obsolete - technology. Only when net investment is at a relatively high level is it likely that new technologies will be incorporated and only when net investment is at a very high level indeed is it likely that research and development of new technologies will be at a level commensurate with the demands of a high-living-level, highly competitive, forward-moving society. If we lose sight of these levels of investment and of the intensity of the incentives necessary to realise them, then the economic results could be serious and fundamental changes could take place in the relative significance of certain economies, whether in East or West, developing or developed.Does this suggest that modern economies and societies are on an intolerable treadmill of ever-continuing economic progress and growth? To some extent of course it does. For man, some might say there is no other way than upward - unless it is a sharp decline and fall. Man must be the eternal worker, the eternal striver for better things; if not, he is damned. This embodies a work-ethic attitude which has been partly responsible for driving man to his present standards of material production and satisfactions. Well and good, but why should he go any further?There are perhaps three main reasons. The first is that it is extremely difficult to stop the momentum of economic advancement once it has begun. To some extent it may be said to have got out of human control but it can also be said that, almost no matter what the rate of progress, people want the advantages of increased production and improved distribution. They may not want the accompanying disadvantages but it is often difficult to determine whether the opposition to the latter is greater than the fervour with which people embrace the former. The second reason is that, if it were possible simply to stop further advances, that in itself would probably cause more disruption and distress than just going on. Modern economies and societies are adapted to growth and not to a static situation. Much of the infrastructure of education and research would have to be dismantled in a no-growth society. Factories would be rebuilt as they always were. Priorities would be regarded as fixed. Forms of occupation and the proportions of the population engaged in them would remain unchanged from one generation to another. While such a scenario would not be impossible of implementation, it would create great difficulties and probably would cause more pain - physical and psychological - than continuing in a disciplined way to allow the society and the economy to move, on a fairly regular, continuing basis, to higher levels of social and economic satisfaction. In the end, it is probably not change itself but only the nature and extent of change which is variable.The third reason is that the advanced economies will almost certainly have others constantly treading on their heels. This is likely to be all the more so if the advanced economies put up a 'stop' sign as a matter of policy for themselves. The 'stop' sign cannot be made to apply to others. The policies of the 1970s must be looked at in this context. The temporary 'stop' sign erected so frequently in the highly developed Western economies has meant that the vital force of investment has been lost or gravely reduced. The position of strength of these countries - economic and other - has consequently been eroded. This is not to say that there should not be adjustments of economic (and other) relations and changes in relative economic (and other) power among individual countries and groups of countries, not only according to some 'epochal' pattern but preferably on a steady, evolutionary basis. The great disadvantge of recent developments has been that the changes have been undesigned and have, for the most part, been the contrary of what has been intended. The world economy has been, if not on an uncharted course, on a course where the charts are out of date and where the shoals and rocks, the havens and harbours are differently situated from what the master economic mariners had earlier come to learn. Let us just make one particular analysis of the results of slowing down a highly-developed economy in the 1970s and 1980s in the circumstances of social protection of high living standards and a prominent role for government in a mixed economy. As our earlier analysis implies, aggregate demand throughout the world economy now tends not to fall even in periods of so-called recession. There may be sharp variations from one country to another, with demand clearly down in one - or apparently so - while demand is clearly up in another. However, a closer examination will probably reveal some special features in the movements of demand. Even in the country or countries in which demand is down, it will usually be found - if it is a highly-developed Western economy - that final consumer demand has scarcely moved down at all but has remained steady and might even have moved up in real terms. The movement down in these countries will be only in investment and production. Demand will therefore have dropped for non-consumer goods: demand will have fallen for capital equipment (machinery and offices and so on), for raw materials and for intermediate products (such as steel) used in the process of production. But relatively few of those products suffering from a decline in effective demand will be consumer goods and declines in some (for example, those consumer durables affected by credit restrictions) will tend to be offset by surges in others (for example, food, clothing, entertainment, holidays, for which high mortgage rates for housing and high interest rates for consumer durables will have released consumer funds).If final consumer demand remains high but production falls in some highly-developed Western countries, who meets the demand for final consumer products in those countries? The answer is those countries, including developing countries, which have supplies available for export and especially those countries which are expanding their economies and are seeking to promote their exports. These countries, if they are exporting, for example, textiles and motor-cars, will find that there is a good and even buoyant market for these products even in the countries going through a period of 'recession'. The aggregate demand for textiles or motor-cars stays high. What changes is the proportion of the market which goes to particular producers. Those producers who cease or reduce their production inevitably lose their share of the market or see it reduced. Domestic producers might thus give way to foreign producers. British Leyland sees its share of the market reduced to the benefit of Japanese producers.Let us remember that a government's efforts to damp down the economy - under Keynesian or monetarist rules - are intended to reduce economic activity, to reduce production, to reduce employment and capacity-utilisation of factories or mills or whatever. Economic activity goes down, so the economic cliché still runs, and stability of prices, balance between demand and supply is achieved in the market. Therefore, the reduction of output - even the cessation of output - by domestic producers is not accidental; it is an outcome deliberately sought by government policy. But what happens if consumer demand stays high? One possible result, as we have described before, is that high consumer demand directed to reduced domestic supply causes retail prices of textiles or motor-cars or whatever to rise steeply. An alternative result - for an open or relatively open economy - is that, for internationally-traded goods, imports will flow into the economy to satisfy the shortage of supply caused by reduction of domestic production. This will mean that the supply of textiles or motor-cars or whatever will remain fairly constant, prices will rise less than would have been the case if demand had had to be met from reduced domestic supply and imports will take over a higher proportion of the market from domestic production. The exercise in 'damping down the economy' has achieved nothing except to move the economy in a direction to favour the non-domestic producer.Against this background, some developing countries have discovered a booming market for their exports of consumer goods even when that market is in countries suffering from a 'recession' or from restrained economic activity directly caused by government economic policies of 'stability.' Initially, these policies of 'stability' are not aimed at the 'restructuring' of domestic industry, but, as time goes on and imports continue to flow in to take an increasing proportion of the market away from domestic production, this trend is seen as showing definitively that domestic industry needs to be 'restructured'. Domestic industry is now seen not to be competitive with imports (often from low-wage, developing countries, but often too from highly-developed, relatively high-growth countries such as Japan) and to need therefore to 'move out' of such traditional industries as textiles, motor-cars and shipbuilding into some other industries (usually undefined or only vaguely and broadly defined) in which its competitive capacity is believed or assumed to be somehow more sturdy.What we must also bear in mind is that, if there is a continuing high level of demand for and supply of consumer goods - whether supply is from domestic or foreign sources - there must somewhere be a continuing demand for and supply of those raw materials and other producer goods and services which go into or contribute to their supply. The reduction of domestic output of motor-cars will mean a reduced demand for, and thus probably reduced supply of, domestic steel for those domestically produced cars; but that does not mean that demand falls for steel produced somewhere else or that steel fails to be supplied somewhere else for motor-car production. Obviously, steel continues to be produced and sold at high levels, because cars continue to be produced and marketed at much the same level for the economy in 'recession'; the only change has been the proportion of total demand for motor-cars being supplied from domestic and foreign production. Thus, demand for steel tends to move away from the country in 'recession' to the country supplying an increased proportion of the car market. So it is too with the raw materials which go into steel production - mainly iron ore and coal - and with the demand for investment goods - new mills, new equipment, new buildings, larger ports and so on. The result is a readjustment - perhaps a major readjustment - of the world economy in favour of a group of exporting, growth countries, to the disadvantage of one or a group of importing, 'restraint' countries. A wholly unplanned, unintended and incidental 'restructuring' has taken place in the world economy. While it may have occurred in response to short-term pressure, the results may be extremely hard to reverse and the 'restructuring' might therefore assume a long-term, quasi-permanent character.Any 'restructuring' of economies, if it is to be efficient - if it is to lead to a better economic and social allocation of scarce resources - should be planned and purposeful; it should not be the outcome of mistaken policies. That means that 'restructuring' - which takes place anyway, virtually all the time, whether intentional or not - should be the outcome of a well-managed complex of policies, each giving the greatest possible reinforcement to the others.
(1) The above was written in 1983 - twenty-two years ago.
(2) It was published as part of "The Reconstruction of the World Economy" (pp.82-89), by Longman Cheshire of Melbourne in March 1984 - twenty-one years ago.
(3) It remains as applicable today as it was then; indeed, the imperatives to which it appeals are even more crucial to our understanding and our policies now.
(4) The author is J.W.C. Cumes

James Cumeshttp://www.authorsden.com/jameswcumes

Sunday, January 02, 2005

A Silver Lining 

"Look for the silver lining,
Whene'er a cloud appears in the blue..."

The words of Jerome Kern's famous song buoyed our spirits in the depths of the Great Depression. Perhaps they can do something the same for us now.
The devastation wrought by the tsunami has reminded us of the common vulnerability of us all. The natural extension should be that we hold together for our common protection and defence, we support one another in adversity and reject the concept of fighting each other in order to extract some "benefit" for one part of humanity from some other part.
Strangely, the devastation of the tsunami has given me comfort, because it has brought forth a response from so many societies. That response has not been to indulge in some exercise of "shock and awe" of the kind we have seen so often in recent years. Nor has it been to ignore the suffering of our fellow human beings - to stand aside and, at best, to engage in empty rhetoric about what we will do or might do at some time in the vaguely defined future.
There was a short period of a few days when the world, seemingly traumatised by the catastrophe, did not seem to know what to do. But that period soon passed. Now the response - the practical response - has come from most parts of our world society - often from those who are poor, suffering and traumatised themselves, as well as from the rich and those who have been spared most of the suffering endured by others.
In some ways, the devastation itself is reminiscent of the terrible destruction of life and property during the Second World War. Whole towns and cities have been destroyed - have ceased to exist as functioning human societies. At that time of world war, shocked by what we had done, we devised ways of reconstructing the devastated areas and restoring life to those human societies.
Just as in the years after World War Two, we have now revealed our capacity for generosity to our fellows and we have revealed too just how great that capacity is - or can be. I have said "generosity to our fellows" but that is not really an accurate way of describing our response to earlier devastation brought about by our own conflicts or the devastation now caused by the awesome power of natural forces. In reality, we are being generous to ourselves - we are, by our common effort, shoring up our defences against the terrifying vulnerability of us all.
How great is this "generosity"? To this day, just one week after the catastrophe, it has, in money terms, already exceeded $2 billion. Like the tragic and ever-increasing numbers of the dead and displaced, this tally of aid has been increasing hugely day by day and the indications are that it will continue to increase as the days and the weeks pass and the enormity of the disaster is borne in on us all ever more emphatically.
We are aware too that it is not only money that has been and will be given. Food and clean water, shelter and medical supplies, restoration of infrastructure and of the means for people to ensure their livelihood, are already being delivered to the needy. For now, it is only a trickle - a melancholy trifle compared with the needs of the survivors. However, each day - each hour - more facilities are being set in place, more supplies are being provided, to enable the trickle to become a flow and for the flow to become a flood - a flood of practical help to make good the flood of devastation caused by the waters of the tsunami.
We cannot yet be sure that the spirit of the world society will hold up long enough to provide all that is needed for as long as it is needed. All we can have at this moment is hope and a belief - not entirely firm - that we have learned the lesson of our common humanity, our common vulnerability and our need to support each other when any one of us is in trouble.
Perhaps the past years - the past decades - have placed too much stress on the "bottom line". Perhaps we have assigned too much virtue to making money and too little virtue to distributing our resources more fairly. Perhaps governments - and yes, the international agencies for which governments are responsible - have assigned too much virtue to doing less and spending less for human welfare, for the well-being of their own citizens and others, on cutting taxes and other social income that might be used to alleviate human suffering. Perhaps we have assigned too little virtue to providing a "safety net" for everyone - a safety net that the tsunami has reminded us, might be needed at some time in all our lives, by each and every one of us, whatever our race, our religion, our economic and social status, or any other criterion by which we shortsightedly seek to divide our common humanity.
Perhaps - no, certainly! - we have spent far too much, criminally too much, on arming ourselves as never before with weapons whose only purpose is to kill our fellow human beings and destroy our civilisation. We have been obsessed with the idea that we can somehow prevail, if we can gather more and "better" weapons into our society and "shock and awe" our enemies, real or imagined. We have sought to reduce our common vulnerability by arming ourselves ever more fearsomely to intensify the vulnerability of others; and we have succeeded only in intensifying the vulnerability of us all.
Will the terrible catastrophe wrought by the tsunami prompt us to look at these issues again?
We must remember too that the world is full of other catastrophes: conflicts in other parts of the world, as well as within the region of the tsunami itself, that have killed millions of innocent people; and widespread, chronic poverty that shortens the lives and diminishes the enjoyment of life of tens and hundreds of millions more.
The reponse to the present catastrophe has revealed what we CAN do - what resources we CAN mobilise to meet a humanitarian crisis of the most terrifying dimensions. It has revealed too that we can be PRACTICAL in our response. We can mobilise, not just paper money, but goods and services that we all need to survive and lead lives of a quality to which we may all reasonably aspire.
We can do it. The question is whether we will do it. We have talked about a Marshall-Plan approach. In Victory Over Want, I have advocated such an approach, inaugurated by direct democratic initiative, since governments and their international agencies have so far totally failed to offer any such inauguration. Perhaps now there will be such a swell of world opinion that governments will be forced to change their past policies and apply their will and their resources to make our world a better place - a place where we can all be less vulnerable to the war and terrorism that are inflicted by mankind on itself and to the forces of nature that we cannot control but against which we can stand together in common purpose.
So perhaps we can recall a few more lines of Jerome Kern's famous song -

Remember somewhere the sun is shining,
And so the right thing to do
Is make it shine for you.
A heart full of joy and gladness
Will always banish sadness and strife...

The challenge, at this time of "sadness and strife" must be, not to weep together in despair, but to make today a turning point at which we determine to join together, in practical ways, "to find" - for every one of us - "the sunny side of life".


James Cumes
__________________
"Uncle Rupert is beautifully narrated, with a wonderful sense of warmth and detail."Order your copy from - http://www.magellanbooks.com/jamescumes.html orhttp://www.authorsden.com/jameswcumes

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